

AGESILAUS AND SPARTA*

In 404 Sparta stood supreme, militarily and politically master of Greece, in concord with Persia. By 362, the year at which Xenophon terminated his history on the sad note of 'even greater confusion and uncertainty', she was eclipsed militarily, never to win a great battle again, and so far from being master even of the Peloponnese that she would spend the rest of time struggling to recover her own ancestral domain of Messenia, no longer a world power, merely a local wrangler. The reasons for all this which are to seek are of absorbing interest and prime importance for the history of Greece, but it is hard to resist the temptation to connect the change with the policies of Agesilaus whose reign virtually coincided with the period in question. He was king for forty-one years and over thirty of them well before the battle of Leuctra (Plut. *Ages.* 40) and he had influence in the state unequalled as far as we can tell by any other king. We are comparatively well informed about him and it is clear enough that, although he had his critics, he was never put on trial as many others, including his brother Agis (Thuc. 5.63) and his contemporary Pausanias (Paus. 3.5.2, Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.25), are known to have been.¹ This was due no doubt, in part at least, to his tactful attention to the ephors and the members of the Gerousia. Plutarch (*Ages.* 4) records his studied deference; when the ephors summoned him, he would obey at the double, a droll spectacle perhaps in view of his lameness (Plut. *Ages.* 2, Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.3) but very satisfactory proof of the submissiveness required of Spartan kings; unlike Lysander (Plut. *Lys.* 18), he was chary of honours unsuitable for an Equal (Xen. *Ages.* 11.7, Plut. *Ages.* 2); his house and his manner of life were plain (Xen. *Ages.* 8.7 f.). By such means the man whom Theopompus (F 321) could describe as 'by common consent the greatest and most illustrious of the Greeks of his time', avoided trouble with the authorities (τὰ τέλη). Doubtless, too, he dealt tactfully with his rivals (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.20 and Cic. *ad Q.F.* 1.2.7). But was it only a matter of tact? Kings at Sparta were in essence only priests and hereditary generals (Ar. *Pol.* 1285²⁵ ff.). The importance of Agesilaus over so many decades² argues wide support among Spartiates as a whole and one is bound to ask whether the policies of the state were not essentially his policies and whether he was in effect the architect of Sparta's ruin. Many have indeed thought so,³ and, if Agesilaus is cheerfully to be made responsible for all that Sparta did and did not do, the conclusion is plain enough, and very comforting to moralists. There is, however, an uncomfortable alternative and it is the theme of this paper that there were always the two strands in Agesilaus' policy, albeit inconsistent, Panhellenism and what Xenophon terms φιλευταιρία, 'support of supporters', that in both he met constant and frequently effective opposition, and that his policies did not

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¹ It is hard to take seriously the story of prosecution by ephors in Plut. *Ages.* 5.4, which seems to be on a par with the story from Theophrastus in 2.6.

² Cf. the far larger number of *apophthegmata* of Agesilaus than of any other Greek in Plut. *Mor.* 208 ff.

³ e.g. K.J. Beloch, *GG* III² 1, p.109, and most recently G.E.M. de Ste Croix, *The*

Origins of the Peloponnesian War, 160-3.

The main discussions of Agesilaus are E. Zierke, *Agésilaios* (Inaug.-diss., Frankfurt, 1936), R.E. Smith, 'The opposition to Agesilaus' foreign policy' *Historia* 2 (1953/4), 274 ff. See now D. G. Rice, 'Agesilaus, Agesipolis, and Spartan politics 386-379 B.C.' *Historia* 23 (1974), 164 ff. and R. Seager, 'The King's Peace and the balance of power in Greece 386-362 B.C.' *Athenaeum* 52 (1974), 36 ff.

damage Sparta. The explanation of Sparta's fall is to be found elsewhere.

For Xenophon Agesilaus was, in retrospect, 'a thoroughly good man' (*Ages.* 1.1)—the judgement of a devoted admirer, who owed his reputation and prosperity largely to Agesilaus. When Xenophon first returned to the Greek world with the remnants of Cyrus' army, he was held responsible for their lawless behaviour. The black reproach was made against him of 'giving in to the men', 'a demagogue', and at one stage he was in danger of death if Thibron got hold of him (*Anab.* 7.6.4, 43). Suspicion of condoning indiscipline lingered (cf. *Hell.* 3.1.8, and 2.7), but once Agesilaus came on the scene no more is heard of it. Xenophon served in Agesilaus' army, probably enough in all the Asiatic campaigns, and certainly in the return to Greece, and fought at Coronea.⁴ His reward was the estate at Scillus (*Anab.* 5.3.7) on which he lived for about twenty years, peculiarly well placed to enjoy his intimacy with the king and indeed to acquire that personal knowledge of Sparta and Spartiates which makes the *Hellenica* uniquely valuable. His sons were educated in Sparta on the suggestion of Agesilaus (Diog. Laert. 2.54, Plut. *Ages.* 20.2), and on visits to Sparta, for instance at the festival of the Gymnopaedia,⁵ he doubtless enjoyed his hospitality, saw for himself his domestic simplicity (*Ages.* 8.7), and met and heard the talk of the whole circle of Agesilaus' friends, the real source of much of the *Hellenica*.⁶ Xenophon knew his hero well but his hero was also his benefactor and there was a debt of gratitude to be paid. Furthermore, what Xenophon wrote about Agesilaus he wrote long after the most controversial moments of the reign, indeed after the king's death.⁷ Agesilaus died in 360/59.⁸ The lamentation, which is the *Agesilaus*, quickly followed (cf. *Ages.* 10.3) and the second part of the *Hellenica*, written in the course of the next six years, built on what the *Agesilaus* had begun. So the events of the 380s were almost a generation past when Xenophon, himself now ageing, recorded them. Old men forget and time adds its gloss. Xenophon's account of his benefactor needs careful handling. His habitual reserve fascinates and perplexes. For instance, the account of Agesilaus'

⁴ *Anab.* 5.3.6 and Plut. *Ages.* 18.2 for Xenophon at Coronea. The vivid and detailed account of the Asiatic campaigns argues his participation.

⁵ For ξένοι at the Gymnopaedia, Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.61, Plut. *Ages.* 29.3. Perhaps Xenophon was present in 371 (cf. *Hell.* 6.4.16).

⁶ At the common meals there was much discussion of deeds of valour (*Resp. Lac.* 5.6).

⁷ Whether the second part of the *Hellenica* (i.e. 2.3.11 onwards) was written in sections at different dates has been much disputed. I hope to argue elsewhere for the unitarian and 'late' view.

⁸ His death is recorded by Diodorus 15.93.6 under 362/1, but that is of no consequence. According to Plutarch, he was king for forty-one years, 'over thirty of them' before Leuctra, and died at the age of eighty-four (Plut. *Ages.* 40.3). This would put his accession in 402/1. (Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.1 is imprecise, as elsewhere—cf. 5.2.2—and therefore also in his synchronism of the Elean War and

the campaigns of Thibron and Dercyllidas at 3.2.21.) Agesilaus is not recorded as playing any part in the events of 361 (Diod. 15.94), though had he been present in Sparta he might well have confronted Pammenes' small force. So that is probably a year of his absence from Sparta, which he is unlikely to have extended longer than was necessary. If Agesilaus acceded in 402/1, the Elean War, which did not end until early in its third summer (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30) before operations recommenced, must have begun in 403—a possible enough date considering our uncertainties about that war.

However, Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens*, 175 f., opted for winter 360/59 for the death of Agesilaus on the grounds that, although the reign of Tachos ended between 21 Nov. 361 and 20 Nov. 360, there is a long sequence of events to be accommodated, which require Agesilaus' remaining in Egypt in 360. So if 361/60 is the last year of Tachos' reign, 360/59 is the earliest possible for the death of Agesilaus.

accession and the debate about the lame kingship was written by a man who must well have known that Lysander had planned, or was said to have planned, a radical change whereby the kings should be chosen either from all the Spartiates or from all the members of the royal houses regardless of seniority.⁹ Xenophon lets no hint of all this escape when he recounts (*Hell.* 3.3.1 ff.) how Lysander secured the throne for the true son of Archidamus, just as he abstains from comment when Agesilaus in Asia puts Lysander in his place and discredits his influence (*Hell.* 3.4.7 ff.). Again, one can only conjecture what Xenophon thought Agesilaus had in mind when he begged off the command against Mantinea for a reason equally valid for Agesipolis who undertook it (*Hell.* 5.2.3). Poker-faced reserve indeed, and there is obliqueness too. For instance, Phoebidas did what he did at Thebes because he was 'neither reasonable nor really sensible' (*Hell.* 5.2.28), which is Xenophon's answer perhaps to a charge that Agesilaus put him up to it (cf. Diod. 15.20.2). Above all, there are total silences, as for instance concerning the precise relations of Agesilaus and Antalcidas or the Peace Congress before Leuctra (Plut. *Ages.* 25.5 ff.), and one is left guessing the reason. Of course, apologia can break through. Agesilaus did not, he asserts (*Ages.* 2.7 f.), take the risk of joining battle at Coronea with the numerically inferior forces,¹⁰ and, if he did take a risk in the second phase of the battle, his courage at any rate was beyond dispute (*Ages.* 2.12 = *Hell.* 4.3.19); there was no need to underline the strategic error (cf. Plut. *Ages.* 18). One suspects that Agesilaus had been criticized for his conduct of the battle, as, perhaps, he had been blamed for the burning of the temple of Poseidon in 390 which was, so suspiciously for Spartan superstition, followed the next day by the Pathos in Lechaëum; Agesilaus, with admirable resource and solicitude for his men, provided fire for the cooking of their supper, but 'no one knew who was responsible for the burning of the temple' (*Hell.* 4.5.4) and so Agesilaus was in no sense to be blamed for the Pathos. Again, things were said about Agesilaus' fondness for boys (*Hell. Oxy.* 21.3); he certainly enjoyed the company of the youthful Agesipolis and 'boyish talk' (*Hell.* 5.3.20, *Ages.* 8.2). Xenophon laboured to refute the charge; there were no improprieties, not even a kiss (*Ages.* 5.5 ff.). The campaign against Phlius had been criticized and perhaps rightly, but Agesilaus' motive at any rate was laudable (*Ages.* 2.21).¹¹ Thus, apologia. But what of the silences? Did they seek oblivion for what Xenophon could not defend?

Fortunately there is Plutarch, and although much of his *Agesilaus* plainly derives from Xenophon, there is much else (perhaps in no small measure from Theopompus, who is thrice cited¹²) which there is no reason to dismiss. Two passages, in particular, illuminate Xenophon's method. The first concerns the occupation of the Cadmea. Xenophon, in his best moralizing vein, declared that

⁹ Diod. 14.13, Plut. *Lys.* 24-6, 30.

¹⁰ Plut. *Ages.* 17.2 suggests that Agesilaus himself feared that his forces were inadequate.

¹¹ *Taûra* in Xen. *Ages.* 2.21 presumably refers not only to Agesilaus' restoration of the Phliasian exiles but also to his compelling Corinth and Thebes to take back their exiles in the King's Peace, but there is nothing about Theban exiles in Xenophon's account of the Peace in *Hell.* 5.1.33 f. and the return of the Corinthian exiles is in that passage only a consequence of the dissolution of the union with Argos. Perhaps Xenophon is alluding to Agesilaus' insisting on a clause about exiles being included in the Peace. Cf. Cawkwell, *CQ*, N.S. 23 (1973), 59. If this is right, he was

censured for this particular clause, not for the Peace itself which Xenophon says he opposed (*ἀντεῖπε*) and for which, as will be argued, he was not in general responsible.

¹² 10.10 (cf. 40.3), 31.4, 32.14. Xenophon is not explicitly cited, and, where Plutarch appears to be following him, he may be reproducing Theopompus, who used Xenophon freely (*FGH* 115 F 21)—cf. the detail about Diphridas at 17.1, which is not from Xenophon although the surrounding narrative appears to be. Plutarch refers to several other sources, and his life of Agesilaus seems to be in parts largely independent of Xenophon.

the occupation was avenged by the gods at Leuctra (*Hell.* 5.4.1); the seizure he ascribed to the poor judgement of Phoebidas, not to Agesilaus, whose share was no more than to pose the criterion of whether Phoebidas had served the interests of the state (*Hell.* 5.2.28, 32)—a reasonable enough line, since Thebes in negotiating with Olynthus and refusing to allow Thebans to answer the Spartan call (*Hell.* 5.2.15, 27) was perhaps to be numbered amongst the transgressors of the Peace.¹³ But there was a clear distinction between seizing the Cadmea and continuing to occupy it.¹⁴ Plutarch (*Ages.* 23.11) makes clear what Xenophon does not, viz. that Agesilaus not only saved Phoebidas from, presumably, death¹⁵ but also persuaded the city to continue to hold the Cadmea. The silence of Xenophon covers up what he later treated as the cause of divine retribution. The other passage concerns the prelude to Leuctra. In Xenophon the debate in the Spartan assembly is recorded in which one Prothous opposed immediate invasion of Boeotia, but 'the assembly thought he was talking rubbish, for already, it seems, the Divine was leading them on' (*Hell.* 6.4.2). Plutarch (*Ages.* 28.6) informs us that the opponent of Prothous was Agesilaus. If that is true, it is a tell-tale silence. Xenophon was not telling the whole truth about Agesilaus.

Xenophon is a partial witness indeed. He found so much to admire and had so much to be grateful for, that he did not see or did not remember what to him, if not necessarily to us, must have been political failures. But there was more, one suspects, than mere admiration and gratitude. Between Xenophon and Agesilaus there appears to have been a complete concord of political outlook. On the one hand, Xenophon was the devoted Peloponnesian: although his exile was revoked (*FGH* 334 F 32), possibly as early as, or shortly after, the King's Peace,¹⁶ he chose never to return permanently to Athens (*Diog. Laert.* 2.56), and the reason shines through the later books of the *Hellenica*, obsessed as they are with the Peloponnese. Xenophon had tasted at Scillus the good life of the landed aristocracy of the Peloponnese and 'the Peloponnese' had become for him an emotionally powerful concept, the cause for good men to serve (cf. *Hell.* 7.4.35 and 5.1). Agesilaus was, as is to be discussed, the real patron of 'the Peloponnese' which the tolerance of his opponents for democracies could only damage. So Xenophon's allegiance was in this respect inevitable. So too in the other central issue, the cause of Panhellenism. In the course of decades the attitude of Xenophon towards Persia¹⁷ developed and the place of the *Education of Cyrus* and of the *Anabasis* needs to be considered, but it is clear enough from a famous passage in the *Anabasis* (3.2.24 ff.) that Xenophon was yet another of the many Greeks caught up in this sentimental folly. In the *Hellenica* there is nothing explicit,¹⁸ but Panhellenism is to be presumed as the explanation of the astounding silences about the role of Persia in the earlier Common Peaces. Some of Xenophon's silences indicate no more than his range of interests but Spartan relations with Persia were central to his subject and the Persian role must have been of the greatest interest to him. So, like other of his silences such as over the foundation of Messene or the careers of leading Thebans, his silence here must denote bitter

¹³ Cf. Cawkwell, art. cit., 53.

¹⁴ Xenophon obscures this distinction (*Hell.* 5.4.1) with *κατασχόμενος*.

¹⁵ Phoebidas was fined (*Diod.* 15.20.2, *Plut. Pel.* 6.1).

¹⁶ Cf. Cawkwell, art. cit., 59, n. 1.

¹⁷ Cf. Cawkwell, Introduction to *Xenophon: The Persian Expedition* (Penguin Classics, 1972), p. 23 ff.

¹⁸ One may note, however, that Procles of Phlius who expounds dual hegemony (7.1.2) which was part of the doctrine, gets quite a lot of space in the *Hellenica*, and with Xenophon space generally means approbation, silence frequently disapprobation. Callicratidas' and Teutias' sentiments get full expression (1.6.2–11, 5.1.13–17).

distaste and resentment. For a Panhellenist Greece should have been united against the Great King as an enemy, not under him as ally and arbiter, and one may imagine Xenophon at Olympia nodding whole-hearted approval of Panhellenist speeches like the *Olympicus* of Lysias and the *Panegyric* of Isocrates. But what of Agesilaus? Was he really at one with Xenophon in this matter too? Or did he nod approval as Panhellenists talked and smile to himself and think quite differently? Was he free from the sentimental folly of Panhellenism? To his discredit, he was tainted like the rest (as will shortly be argued), and Xenophon and he saw completely eye to eye here too. The truth is that Xenophon could not stand apart and take an independent view. His Agesilaus both in theory and in practice was a 'thoroughly good' man.

Xenophon's partiality is readily discernible and his Agesilaus is very different from the Agesilaus of modern historians. But in one respect Xenophon has had his way. He pronounced the occupation of the Cadmea a fatal error resulting in disaster, and this is curiously like the view prevalent today, that the *Machtspolitik* of Agesilaus proved, as it was bound to prove, disastrous. Against such moralizing history, this paper is directed.

The price of Persian help for Sparta in the Peloponnesian War had been a sort of Medizing. Sparta had had to sign away the independence of the Greek cities of Asia; the Great King's claim to them was the irreducible minimum of all the treaties he made with Greeks after the Peace of Callias. Although during the war there were, from the first, murmurs of discontent from individual Spartans (Thuc. 8.43.3, 52, and cf. 46.3)¹⁹ and Callicratidas, the Nauarch of 407/6, was forthright in his denunciation of the whole policy (1.6.7 ff.),²⁰ Persian aid was indispensable and the concord between Lysander and Cyrus had to be maintained—for the duration of the war. When, however, after the failure of Cyrus' revolt Tissaphernes returned to claim full control over Ionia and the Greeks of Asia appealed to Sparta as champion of Greek liberty, a new period began. Thibron was sent out to defend the Greek cities (3.1.3 f., *Anab.* 7.6.1) and this policy continued unchecked until in the stalemate of the Corinthian War Antalcidas went in 392 to try negotiations for peace (4.8.12 ff.). There was in this period of seven years, as far as we know, no discord in Sparta on the question of relations with Persia. The expedition of 397/6 was ordered simply because rumour of large-scale Persian preparations suggested that a greater effort was necessary to secure the same end (3.4.1 ff.). The man who had been the protagonist of concord with Persia in the Peloponnesian War, Lysander, counselled Agesilaus to propose a large expedition. The proposal was accepted. Agesilaus was simply carrying on what had been begun. He may, of course, for all we know have had a hand in the dispatch of Thibron, but there is no reason to claim that in these years he had to overcome opposition to the policy of intervening on behalf of the Greek cities of Asia.

One might be tempted to suspect some division of opinion about the aims of the expedition. Lysander persuaded Agesilaus to propose 'a campaign against Asia' (*στρατεύεσθαι εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν*—3.4.2) meaning by Asia, perhaps, no less than 'the Persian Empire', and Agesilaus sought, by sacrificing at Aulis as Agamemnon had done (3.4.3), to give the campaign a grandiose significance, to open as it were

¹⁹ Cf. the remark of Lichas (Thuc. 8.84.5) presaging a change of policy when the war was won.

²⁰ From this point onwards all references are to the *Hellenica* unless otherwise stated.

a new chapter in the great conflict of East and West.²¹ In contrast with this trumpeting the grant by the Spartans of a mere six months' supplies (3.4.3) strikes a muted note, and one might wonder whether everyone at Sparta regarded the expedition in the same way as Agesilaus. Yet he himself on arriving in Asia behaved in a moderate fashion, clearly at first seeking no more than an accommodation with the Persians which would guarantee the autonomy of the Greek cities. His very first act was to make a truce with Tissaphernes, to see if diplomacy could secure this modest end (3.4.5), and in the following year he made a truce with Tithraustes while a new formula which left the Greeks autonomous but paying tribute to Persia was explored (3.4.25 f.). This seemingly outrageous suggestion of Tithraustes was not brusquely repudiated. Agesilaus simply declared that he could not make such an agreement without the approval of the Spartan 'authorities'. So much for Aulis and the great conflict of East and West. Only when these negotiations came to nothing did larger designs emerge. The march up the Hermus of 395 had been directed merely against Phrygia,²² but he planned in spring 394 'to march up-country as far as he could' (4.1.41; cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 22.4), the projected campaign so grandiosely described by Plutarch (*Ages.* 15.1).²³ But even this Panhellenist flourish need not be regarded as the special contribution of Agesilaus. In the autumn of 395 he received instructions from Sparta to appoint as nauarch whomsoever he chose and to use the fleet in combined operations if he wished (3.4.27 f.) to assist him in his design of 'destroying the empire which formerly campaigned against Greece' (*Ages.* 1.36). No answer to Tithraustes' earlier proposal is explicitly recorded, but evidently this new power for Agesilaus was the consequence of its rejection.²⁴ There was to be no compromise over the autonomy of the Greek cities and Agesilaus was to press on with a larger strategy which would compel the Great King to a soberer frame of mind. Such was the decision of the Spartan government.

So there is no case for supposing that the expedition of 396–394 was the project of Agesilaus carried through against strong opposition at Sparta. We do not know that it was not opposed and Xenophon was not the person to tell us if it was. Yet it all seems a natural enough development from the decision to send

²¹ Cf. *Xen. Ages.* 1.8, which appears to use 'Asia' to mean the Persian Empire (cf. *Hdt.* 1.4.4, *Thuc.* 8.58.2).

²² Cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 12.1, *pace Xen.* 3.4.20 ἐπὶ τὰ κράτιστα τῆς χώρας, which has a grandiose sound. (All references to *Hell. Oxy.* are to Bartoletti's numbering.)

²³ Cf. *Pel.* 30.3. Ephorus had the same notion (*Diod.* 15.31.3). *Hell. Oxy.* 22.4 which speaks of Agesilaus intending to march from Cappadocia to the southern coast, 'to Cilicia and Phoenicia', might be urged as evidence of more modest intentions (cf. *Isoc.* 4.144, where what Agesilaus is said to have nearly done may reflect what he hoped to accomplish in 394), but, if he included Phoenicia in his designs, his designs were indeed large.

²⁴ 3.4.27 places the reception of the message conferring the right to appoint the nauarch during Agesilaus' march north when he was near Kyme. Since Grenfell and

Hunt's commentary on the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (in *P. Oxy.*, vol. v) it has been presumed that the reference to the nauarch Chiricrates in *Hell. Oxy.* 22.4 argues that Pisander had not been appointed by winter 395/4, but this is not a necessary inference —ὅς ἐπιβάτης τῷ ναυάρχῳ χειρικράτει πεπλευκῶς may simply be explaining who the man was and how he came to be in the Hellespont; it does not necessarily prove that Chiricrates was still nauarch. So Xenophon may well be right in his dating of the message which may well have been joined to the answer rejecting Tithraustes' proposal.

It has been suggested to me that the point of the Spartan government letting Agesilaus appoint the nauarch was to secure more effectively the action against Caria which had been demanded of Dercylidas (3.2.12). But such action is unlikely to have been required or expected of Agesilaus, since he proceeded with a quite different strategy.

Thibron in 399, and, if the case for regarding Agesilaus as a Panhellenist rested solely on the events of these years, it would be weak indeed.

Nor are the Panhellenist utterances of his step-brother, Teleutias, much to the point. Certainly, on Aegina he voiced strong criticism of the policy of letting Persia be Sparta's pay-master (5.1.14–17). He was speaking at the very moment when Antalcidas was 'up' with the King negotiating a new concordat with Persia (cf. 5.1.25), and Teleutias is made by Xenophon to echo the famous words of Callicratidas leaving the court of Cyrus in disgust (cf. 1.6.7 and 5.1.17).²⁵ But all this was before the King's Peace, and does nothing to prove that that event did not induce in Agesilaus a new and cynical view of relations with Persia. If Agesilaus is to be argued consistently Panhellenist, the case must be made for the period after 387/6.

One should not be misled by Xenophon's account of the oath-swearing (*Hell.* 5.1.32 ff.). Agesilaus was in charge of the oath-swearing as king, and his prominence in no way argues that the King's Peace was especially of his seeking. To judge by the two treaties of 421 (Thuc. 5.19.2, 23.4, 24.1), the kings seem regularly to have been involved in the swearing of treaties, and although it is nowhere stated who administered the oaths at Sparta, it is likely enough to have been the kings, and since Agesipolis was still young (cf. *Hell.* 4.2.9) Agesilaus would naturally be prominent. He was bitter and severe towards the Thebans (διὰ τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους ἔχθραν §33), whose activities had checked his planned Anabasis, and he enforced the letter of the Peace against them, but that does not necessarily mean that he had sought the Peace in order to do so. He may have been making the best of what he considered a bad job.²⁶

The first positive point to consider is the relationship of Agesilaus and Antalcidas. Those who view Agesilaus as the cynical advocate, as well as exploiter, of the King's Peace are fond of citing from Plutarch (*Ages.* 23.4) the reported reply of Agesilaus to the charge that the Spartans were Medizing—'Not so, the Medes are Laconizing'—as if this dictum clinched the matter, and the rest of the chapter is to be brushed aside.²⁷ But is it? Agesilaus is said 'to have had very little share of this disgrace (i.e. arising from the surrender to Persia of the Greeks of Asia), for Antalcidas was opposed (ἐχθρὸς) to him and made every effort to get the Peace, thinking that the war would advance Agesilaus and secure him very great power and renown'. The passage has been cheerfully rejected.²⁸ Would Xenophon, it is asked, have omitted matter which could have exonerated his hero? But he did. He referred in the *Agesilaus* (8.3) to Agesilaus' blunt rebuff to an offer of friendship by Artaxerxes; he did not include it in the *Hellenica* although he, unlike us, knew the precise occasion on which it was made.²⁹ Nor did he directly

²⁵ Cf. Accame, *Ricerche intorno alla guerra corinzia*, 142.

²⁶ For the opposition to the Peace alleged by Xen. *Ages.* 2.21, see above, note 11.

²⁷ Most recently, de Ste Croix, *op. cit.*, 161.

²⁸ R. E. Smith, *Historia* 2 (1953–4), 277, n. 6 gives the history of the rejection. E. Zierke, *Agesilaos*, 50 f., is an honourable exception.

²⁹ Cf. Plut. *Ages.* 23.10, where the form of Agesilaus' reply suggests that the offer was made either at the making of a peace or

at some later date. 'The Persian with Callias' is therefore probably the representative of the King who swore the oaths in Sparta in 386 (Tod, *GHI* 118, 1.12, and cf. 7.1.39 for a Persian in the same role later). So perhaps when Antalcidas returned to operations in 387 (5.1.25), Callias remained to await the outcome and accompanied the King's representative to Sardis and then to Sparta. However, later negotiations of which we are not informed may have provided the occasion. Callias was in Asia with Agesilaus, perhaps as one of his thirty Spartiate counsellors (4.1.15, 3.4.2), but is not heard of elsewhere.

concern himself with the internal politics of Sparta. For instance, he had Teleutias on Aegina criticizing the policy of seeking Persian aid (5.1.14 ff.), but when he recorded the dispatch of Antalcidas in pursuit of that policy (5.1.6) he gave no hint of debate in Sparta itself. Divisions did emerge in the trial of Sphodrias (*Hell.* 5.4.25), as they had to if the acquittal was to be made at all intelligible, but generally he eschews such matters.³⁰ Furthermore he wrote for his own age, not for us, in the presumption that his readers knew what he was talking about. If Agesilaus was well known as the opponent of Antalcidas, Xenophon may have felt no need to make the opposition explicit. Apologia could wait until it was necessary, in the sparing of Phoebeidas, in the acquittal of Sphodrias. It argues nothing against the truth of Plutarch's statement that Xenophon gives no confirmation. But, it is also claimed, Plutarch, or his source, made it all up, for no more reason than that Agesilaus had fought the Persians and Antalcidas made the peace, or that Antalcidas opposed Agesilaus' policy of invading Boeotia as may be inferred from a dictum to which Plutarch was much attached.³¹ This, however, is not the only information Plutarch gives us about Antalcidas. He furnishes the patronymic (*Artax.* 21.5), retails a story about his conduct as ephor in 370/69 which contrasted ill with that of Agesilaus (*Ages.* 32.1), describes his personal relations with the Great King on the various embassies to Persia³² and his suicide by starvation in Sparta (*Artax.* 22, *Pel.* 30.6), and records a number of his dicta (*Ages.* 26.3, 31.7 f.; *Mor.* 192 B f., 217 C–E). Whence he derived all this information one can only guess, but he clearly was informed and one would need good reason for rejecting his statement about the opposition of Agesilaus to Antalcidas. There is no such good reason.

Secondly, there is the evidence of Isocrates. In his letter to King Archidamus (§11), he said that Agesilaus was the only prominent figure in the world who had 'all his life constantly desired to liberate the Greeks and make war against the Barbarians'. Isocrates was eighty when he wrote this (§16) and one might wonder whether by 356 memories of the 380s and 370s had not been obscured by Agesilaus' excursions to Asia and Egypt (*Xen. Ages.* 2.25–31). There is however other Isocratean evidence. The letter of Speusippus to Philip is now generally accepted as genuine.³³ It is to be dated to 343/2, and in one passage (§13) Speusippus talks about Isocrates' letter to Philip, evidently the Fifth Oration of 346, as the final version of what had earlier been sent to Agesilaus.

So too Isocrates. In his younger days he joined with Timotheus in sending to the Athenian people letters disparaging you Macedonians, and, now he's an old man, as if he hated or envied you he has passed over the majority of your good points and sent off a speech to you personally which first of all he wrote for Agesilaus; later making small revisions he put it on offer to Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily; then for the third time, putting bits in and taking bits out, he tried passing it off to Alexander, the Thessalian. Now, for the last time of asking, in his tight-fisted way he has flung it at you.

When was this letter sent³⁴ to Agesilaus? 'Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily' is

³⁰ For instance, Ephorus referred to King Pausanias being expelled by the other royal house (*FGH* 70 F 118 *ad fin.*) but the notice of the trial and condemnation (3.5.25) gives no hint of this.

³¹ *Ages.* 26.3, *Mor.* 189 F, 213 F, 217 E, 227 C.

³² *Plut. Art.* 22.6 suggests that Antalcidas went on his final embassy when Agesilaus was in Egypt in 361 (an interesting divergence of policy, the one wooing, the other opposing

the King).

³³ Cf. E. Bickermann and J. Sykutris, *Speusipps Brief an König Philipp* (Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie, Philol.-hist. Klasse 80, 1928).

³⁴ It is to be noted that Speusippus used the imperfect in the cases of Agesilaus and Dionysius, the aorist of Alexander and Philip; there may have been a number of appeals to the former two.

presumably Dionysius I who died in 367. So it must be before that date. But in any case an appeal to Agesilaus after Leuctra is inconceivable: Agesilaus had too much to occupy him and a Spartan king was no longer to be thought of as the man to lead the Greeks, Thebans included. On the other hand, the speech must be later than the *Panegyric* of 380 which twice mentions Agesilaus (§ § 144, 153) but could in no sense be said to be addressed to him. So it must have been at some time in the 370s, and, since Greece was at peace only between the Peace of 375 and the resumption of hostilities in 373, the probable enough setting for an appeal to Agesilaus is in 375/4,³⁵ in the shadow of the peace which established concord between the leading land and naval powers of Greece, the necessary precondition of a crusade against Persia. Such precision however, is not here important. The real point is that in the 370s Isocrates considered Agesilaus a suitable person to take charge of the Panhellenic campaign against Persia. If he had been responsible for the making of the King's Peace, in view of all that Isocrates had to say about the Peace in the *Panegyric*, such an appeal would hardly have been made. So Isocrates in the 370s was taking the same view of Agesilaus that he was to take in 356—Agesilaus was consistently Panhellenist.

Finally there is the evidence of Theopompus and Ephorus, or, rather, the Ephoran tradition in Diodorus. Isocrates in the *Panegyric* (§ 135) of 380 remarked that the Persian forces were Greek, and 'the rebels are friendly disposed towards us Athenians and are handing themselves over (*ἐνδιδοῦσιν*) to the Spartans', and this odd claim is supported by both Theopompus and Diodorus. According to Theopompus' account in Book XII of the *Philippica* (F 103), shortly before the end of the Cyprian War Evagoras sent an embassy to Sparta. In Diodorus (15.9.3 f.) the notice of the end of the Cyprian War is followed by the revolt of the Persian admiral, Glos, who appeals to Sparta for alliance. (Diodorus has the Spartans accept his offer, which is impossible, but this Diodoran flourish, paralleled elsewhere,³⁶ should not discredit the whole story.) What grounds were there for these appeals? Of course, Evagoras was getting into desperate straits and might turn to anyone, however improbable. But what grounds could Glos have for thinking that after the collapse of the Cyprian War there was any point whatsoever in appealing to Sparta, the Great King's great friend? Sparta was faring very well under the King's Peace. By 380 Mantinea had been dealt with, the discipline of Phlius begun, and the Peloponnese was in hand; Theban ambition had been checked and Olynthus was feeling the first of the lash; Sparta could feel no dissatisfaction with the progress towards a full restoration of the empire of 404 and following years. There had been no unanswered appeals to Persia. Sparta had no need of outside help. Yet the Great King's enemies sought help at Sparta, and such appeal was not pronounced hopeless by Isocrates. One may conjecture that it was known that not all were of one mind at Sparta. But who was dissident? At least it will be conceded that no other candidate for this honour than Agesilaus can even be named. He alone is said to put up any opposition to the Peace, even if only temporarily (Xen. *Ages.* 2.21), to have been the opponent of Antalcidas, negotiator of the Peace (Plut. *Ages.* 23), to have spurned the letter of friendship sent by the Great King (Xen. *Ages.* 8.3), to have been appealed to by Isocrates (Speusippus, *Letter to Philip* 13). Glos and his Oriental kind had some expect-

³⁵ Agesilaus had been on active service in 377 and an appeal two years later is conceivable even though he was by then seventy (cf. above, note 8), not that the prac-

tical consideration of the commander's age would have much concerned Isocrates.

³⁶ Cf. 16.77.3.

ations. Who else can be named who would be expected to receive them with sympathy?

The case is not as full as one could wish. Our knowledge of Spartan political wrangles is very superficial. Yet there is enough to justify the claim that Agesilaus did not renounce in the 380s and 370s his Panhellenist ideas of the 390s. Of course there was some development of views. The notion of a great crusade and a march 'up-country' in the course of which the Great King would be made to fight 'for Asia' (Xen. *Ages.* 1.8) was in this period quite unrealistic and, underneath, the Greeks probably knew it. Cyrus the Younger had come near to succeeding in his family quarrel, the success of single combat on the field of Cunaxa, but for the conflict of East and West there was needed something like the League of Corinth which could provide a much larger army than Agesilaus could have mustered for 394. Even if he had succeeded in crossing from Paphlagonia to Cilicia³⁷ as he appears to have planned to do (*Hell. Oxy.* 22.4), little would have been accomplished. The defeat of Tissaphernes in 395 (*Hell. Oxy.* 12.1, Diod. 14.80.4) did not detach Lydia from loyalty and hopes of a general Satraps' Revolt (*Hell.* 4.1.41) caused by a Greek invasion were vain. Behind the large professions of Agesilaus³⁸ lay clear enough recognition that all that could be gained was independence for the Greeks of Asia. Negotiations and military pressure were the means to this limited end. Agesilaus fought against and agreed with the Satraps and found the Great King's loyal servants agreeable indeed (*Hell.* 3.4.26, 4.1.38). The events of the 360s changed all that. Once Persia had abandoned Sparta as her ally in Greece as she did during the embassy of Pelopidas in 367 and assented to the independence of Messene (*Hell.* 7.1.36 f.), concord with the servants of the Great King was impossible. Only rebels could be dealt with (*Ages.* 2.26 ff.). The sentimental Panhellenist became, in Xenophon's word, 'the Persian-hater' (*Ages.* 7.7—*μισοπέροης*).

Xenophon himself went through a parallel development. Throughout the *Education of Cyrus* he curiously lauds the virtues of Cyrus and the Persian nobility, until in the last chapter (8.8) he turns on them savagely and denounces their degeneracy. The contrast is so striking that it has been generally accepted that the chapter, written after 362 (cf. §4 f. and Diod. 15.92), was a late addition. So Xenophon too had a period when he regarded the Persian as a foe but an admirable foe.³⁹ The Persian concord with Thebes, which threatened the good life of the Peloponnese, changed all that. Like Agesilaus, he ended in bitter hatred, *μισοπέροης*. On that subject at least, they were in complete harmony.

The early history of the Peloponnesian League, the instrument whereby Sparta controlled in large measure the Peloponnese, is disputed. The most satisfactory account would appear to be that which grounds the extension of Spartan influence in a policy of suppressing tyrannies and restoring exile aristocracies with which she entered into agreements of friendship and mutual defence. This certainly was the view held by Herodotus who made a Corinthian spokesman, on the occasion of a perverse Spartan proposal to restore the Athenian tyrant, Hippias,

³⁷ Xenophon remarked on the seriousness of loss of the Paphlagonians (4.1.28), which really aborted the whole plan.

³⁸ There was little novelty in Agesilaus' plan. There had been talk of anabasis in Herodotus' day. Cf. *Hdt.* 5.49 f., and 6.84.2,

projects hardly conceivable before the Persian Wars.

³⁹ For the place of the *Anabasis* in Xenophon's development, see Cawkwell, Introduction to *Xenophon: The Persian Expedition* (Penguin Classics 1972).

whom the Spartans themselves had expelled, declare that the natural order of heaven and earth, land and sea, was reversed when Spartans 'put down governments of Peers (*ἰσοκρατίαι*) and prepared to restore tyrants to the cities' (5.92). Herodotus may have been misinformed about the sixth century, or have imagined a general rule on the strength of a few instances, properly to be explained otherwise, but his words were at the least a reflection of the situation which he observed for himself in the fifth century, and which Thucydides (1.19) described in similar terms—'the Spartans exercised hegemony over their allies not by keeping them in tribute-paying status but through oligarchy, making sure that the allies ran their states in a way that suited the Spartans.'⁴⁰ Sparta, the city of Equals (*ὅμοιοι*), was herself a government of Peers, living around a city without walls in villages (*κατὰ κώμας*), and her aim was to establish a similar order as far as possible elsewhere. After the Persians retired from Greece in 479, the Spartans even tried to persuade Athens not to have walls but to join with them in removing the walls of such states outside the Peloponnese as possessed them (Thuc. 1.90). What they recommended to Athens they had themselves widely secured within the Peloponnese. States which had walls by the time of entering into alliance with Sparta, such as perhaps Tegea and Orchomenus,⁴¹ were in this respect past redemption but many were still in the more primitive condition of having merely an acropolis, a walled refuge, and living in villages. Such for instance were Elis and Mantinea which, before their synoecism at a time when Sparta was unable to prevent it, consisted of a number of parishes (Diod. 11.54.1, Strabo 337), and the effect of Spartan policy was well seen in the history of Megalopolis which was founded, after the ending of Spartan control, by the Synoecism of a large number of small places (Paus. 8.27.3 f., cf. Diod. 15.94.1) in an area well suited by geography to have contained a large city at a much earlier date. The ideal was landed aristocracy, without walled cities, but not defenceless. Just as Sparta kept herself inviolate from outside by her own army (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 217 E) and internally by ingrained devotion to the Lycurgan constitution, so too the landed aristocracies were defended against attack from outside by the military power of Sparta and the League and from internal change by the guarantee of Spartan intervention. In return they made their contribution to the military strength of the League. It was a system of safety in return for service, as Xenophon's remarks on the settlement of Mantinea imposed by the Spartans in 384 (*Hell.* 5.2.7) show.

The city wall was destroyed and the Mantineans were made to live in four separate localities just as they used to live in the olden times. At first they resented it because they had to destroy the dwellings they had and build others. But when the people with the property lived nearer the estates which they had round the villages, enjoyed a system of aristocracy, and were rid of the troublesome demagogues, they were pleased with what had been done. The Spartans would send a call-up officer (*ἐναγός*) for each village, and not just one for the whole, and the Mantineans shared in military service from the villages far more readily than when they were under democracy.

⁴⁰ Cf. 1.76.2, and 144.2.

⁴¹ In view of the rivalry of Tegea and Mantinea in the fifth century (Thuc. 5.65.4, and cf. 4.134.1) one would expect Tegea to be as strong militarily as Mantinea and have walls, but the argument for a wall in the sixth century based on the city's surviving Spartan attacks (cf. F.E. Winter, *Greek Fortifications*,

30, n.60) is not very strong. Orchomenus had a wall in 418 B.C. (Thuc. 5.61.5); since when is unclear. Both fortifications may belong to Sparta's time of troubles in the 470s and 460s. If Strabo 337 is to be taken as meaning that Tegea as well as Mantinea was synoecized under Argive influence, a fifth-century date for the fortification of Tegea is preferable.

The essence is there—no large population secured from external check by city walls to follow the dangerous lead of demagogues, but a landed aristocracy rendering military service in return for security from challenges to their position in society. By no means all members of the Peloponnesian League were in this happy condition. As already remarked, a good number had walls. But even there the Spartans maintained their influence, in Thucydides' phrase (1.19), 'through oligarchy', and in general it may be asserted that the Peloponnesian League was the union of 'the best men', *οἱ βέλτιστοι*, as Xenophon in the accepted usage called them (cf. *Hell.* 5.2.6; 7.3.4; 7.4.26).

A union of 'the best men' one may name it. If there is no more to be said of it, it seems to have been a squalid bargain, dominance in one's own state in return for helping another state to general domination. But there is more to be said. Both parties to the bargain thought of it as service to an ideal. Throughout Greece, there were men who looked to Sparta as the nearest approach to the best form of society. We see them most clearly at Athens. Critias, who in prose and verse lauded everything Spartan⁴² and by extreme violence sought to reorder Athens on the Spartan model, could declare in his attack on Theramenes (2.3.34), as if it was a generally accepted fact, that 'the Spartan constitution is considered, I take it, to be the best (*καλλίστη*).' Assent must have been fairly widespread at the time; the free society lauded by Pericles for its effortless superiority over the strenuous dullness of Sparta had come to disaster and men looked with admiration to Sparta's ordered stability. Plato, like Aristophanes,⁴³ jibed at those who imitate the mere externals of Spartan conduct, long hair, plain dress, and rough play (*Protag.* 342 B, C), but his *Republic* was basically Spartan in inspiration. He was an intellectual who should have known better. More straightforward and characteristic was Cimon, whose sympathy with Sparta was celebrated (Plut. *Cim.* 16) and of whom Stesimbrotus of Thasos declared that 'he was quite free of Attic sharpness and clever-clever talk and had in his character much nobility and honesty, and the very cast of soul of the man was, rather, Peloponnesian.' (ibid. 4.5). At Athens such a man was the exception, but in the Peloponnesian Sparta and the *mirage spartiate* formed a compulsive ideal. 'The Laconizers in the cities' (Plato, loc. cit.) of the Peloponnesians, like Xenophon who settled there (Diog. Laert. 2.54), thought so highly of the Spartan way of life that they sent their sons to Sparta for a Spartan education.⁴⁴ Indeed the number of outsiders among the so-called 'wards' (*τρόφιμοι*) at any moment was probably quite large. At least they were numerous enough in 380 to make a contribution worth mention to the army of Agesipolis (5.3.9). They were also passable imitations of Spartiates; in 243 Agis proposed to enrol them as such (Plut. *Agis* 8.3). Scattered through the states of the Peloponnesians, they formed the nucleus of Laconophiles, the nucleus and the inspiration, as is well illustrated by what happened during the siege of Phlius. This was a city of 5,000 citizens, but those who deserted to Agesilaus' army numbered over 1,000, 'in excellent physical condition, very well disciplined and well armed', who easily fitted in to the system of *syssitia* and whose military bearing forced the critics of Agesilaus to admit that Sparta needed such soldiers to help them (5.3.16 f.). There is no way of discovering how many of these 1,000 had been through the Spartan education system, but clearly there had been enough to leaven the rest. So the Spartiate ideal was spread through the states of the

⁴² Cf. Diels, VS 88 B 6 ff. and 32 ff.

⁴³ Cf. Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta*

in *Classical Antiquity* i.123 ff.

⁴⁴ Phocion did the same (Plut. *Phoc.* 20.4).

Peloponnesian League, and 'the best men' had their eyes fixed upon the *mirage spartiate*, as we can well see in the case of Xenophon himself, who, like Cimon, was a true 'Peloponnesian' at heart. He had had an Athenian education. He did not want it for his sons. Rather, he expressed a profound contempt for hair-splitting sophistry (*Cyneg.* 13 and cf. 12) and preferred the Spartan world where one did not teach the art of argument but trained men in virtue. A devoted convert, he was typical of 'the best men' of the Peloponnese, and it is through his history that we understand them, know a small number by name and glimpse their influence. Their devotion to Sparta and Spartanism was of the essence of the League.

'Guest-friendship', as we see with Xenophon, meant friendship with leading Spartans, not just with Sparta, and probably most of them had their clients widespread through the Peloponnese. It is notable that 'the best' to whom Xenophon gives names and space are in a number of cases 'guest-friends' of the Eurypontids —Xenias of Elis (3.2.27) of Agis (Paus. 3.8.4), Podanemus of Phlius of Archidamus and Procles of Phlius of Agesilaus (5.3.13)—and there are no names of 'guest-friends' of the Agiads, merely the suggestion of discreditable connections as at Mantinea (5.2.3). So one might be tempted to suppose that the Eurypontids were the patrons of the Peloponnesian League. But this would be error. Xenophon tends to name and give space to those who seem to him worth the honour,⁴⁵ and the circle of Agesilaus is his circle. The foreign connections of the rival kings do not win his approval, and find no place in his history, but Agesilaus was not the only Spartan given to entertaining visitors (cf. *Mem.* 1.2.61) and no doubt the Agiads too had their clientele. Indeed ample volunteers from the allied states joined Agesipolis on his expedition to Thrace; even some Thessalians joined the expedition in the hope of becoming known to him (5.3.9), which implies a widespread connection. There is no difference between Agiads and Eurypontids as far as having a clientele is concerned. Where they differ is in the nature of the clientele —unless we are misled by what happened in the cases of Mantinea and Phlius. Xenophon remarked that Pausanias was assuredly on friendly terms with the leaders of the *demos* in Mantinea, and later reported that he intervened with his son to save sixty persons whom Xenophon described as 'the pro-Argos faction and the leaders of the *demos*' (5.2.3 and 6). So Agiad connections with Mantinea were with the very people whose independence Sparta in 385 set out to curb. Similarly in the case of Phlius, which was a democracy⁴⁶ in 380 (5.3.16) and before the King's Peace. The factions of the two leading citizens who were 'guest-friends' of Eurypontid kings had been in exile and were clearly at odds with the leaders of democratic Phlius, who in turn readily supported Agesipolis' expedition with money, perhaps because he was sympathetic to them, and when Agesilaus attacked the city sought to appeal over his head to Sparta, presumably because they hoped for better treatment from his opponents (*Hell.* 5.3.10–16, 23 ff.). That is all the evidence that can be mustered for the Peloponnesian states, but it matches remarkably the conduct of Pausanias at Athens in 403, for which he was tried on his return to Sparta (*Hell.* 2.4.35, 3.5.25, Paus, 3.5.1 f.). The charge was that he had let the Athenian *demos* off lightly, and in Xenophon's view he was at least suspect of secret dealings with the leaders of the *demos*.

⁴⁵ One may note that Xenophon withholds the name of the polemarch in command of

the division destroyed at the Pathos in Lechaem (4.5.11 ff.), as too of the polemarch who performed so ineptly at the

Isthmus in 369 (7.1.17).
⁴⁶ Cf. R.P. Legon, 'Phliasian politics and policy in the early fourth century' *Historia* 16 (1967), 324 ff.

Clearly enough, the Agiads too had their clientele in the allied states, but their preference appears not to have excluded men who could be described as 'leaders of the people', and this implies a strikingly different view of how Sparta could best maintain control of the Peloponnese. In the fifth century that had been done, as Thucydides (1.19) remarked, 'through oligarchy'. The Agiads of the early fourth century seem to have envisaged another method, viz. tolerating democracies in the hope that they would not take the final step of separating themselves from Sparta.

At first glance there was something to be said for such a view. It would be increasingly difficult to check the growth of cities, and unless Sparta came to terms with them the influence of popular leaders would inevitably work ever more strongly against compliance with Spartan wishes. Also, the alternative policy of allowing member states no independence was bound to mean bloodshed and oppression, much at variance with professions of autonomy and freedom. Could the violence of Agesilaus succeed? It is comforting to think not, but with reflexion a hard truth becomes plain. From the point of view of securing essential Spartan interests, Agesilaus was right.

The problem of how to contain the independence of states in the Peloponnesian League varied according to geographical location. Those near to Sparta itself required different treatment from those further away and nearer to states potentially hostile to the League, but it happens that in Mantinea and Phlius we have a case of each sort. In both the policy of Agesilaus was proved sound.

Mantineia and Elis were the two great anomalies in the Spartan system in the fifth century. Both had been synoecized in the troubled period after the Persian Wars,⁴⁷ and had been allowed to develop within the protection of walls⁴⁸ into large cities and so to pursue as democracies independent policies. Both had deserted Sparta for Argos after the Peace of Nicias. Elis had dared to push her wrangle with Sparta over Lepreon to the point of excluding Spartans from competing at the Olympic Games and Agis from praying for victory in the war, had refused to pay her share of the expenses of the war against Athens, and, above all, had forcibly seized a number of perioecic towns.⁴⁹ Mantinea, whose independence during the campaign of Olpae in 426 was remarked by Thucydides (3.107.4, 108.2), had in the course of the Archidamian War subjected part of Arcadia, which she had had to disgorge in the treaty of 418/17 (Thuc. 5.29.1, 33, 81.1), and during the Corinthian War, for a member of the Peloponnesian League, had gone to monstrous lengths: there was a group of politicians Xenophon described as 'pro-Argos' (*Ἀργοῦντες*); corn, he declared, had been sent to that city; calls to military service had been either unheeded or reluctantly obeyed (5.2.2, 6);⁵⁰ the city had

⁴⁷ Diod. 11.54.1 and Strabo 336 for Elis. The case of Mantinea is more arguable. Cf. Andrewes on Thuc. 5.47.

⁴⁸ 3.2.27 has been taken to mean that Elis had no walls in the late fifth century, but Diodorus' account of the war contains mention of a siege (14.17.10 f.) and Pausanias' account of the settlement (3.8.5) includes destruction of the wall of the lower city (*τὸ ἄστυ*), and in Xenophon's account Agis' unwillingness to take the city (*πόλις*) which was unwalled is hard to reconcile both with his aim in the war and with his damaging buildings outside the *ἄστυ* (*τὰ προάστια*). The explanation is

that by *πόλις* Xenophon means the Acropolis unwalled and by ancient custom inviolable, and that the *ἄστυ*, which he mentions in §26, was walled. Cf. the distinction of *πόλις* and *ἀκρόπολις* at 7.4.14 f. (One should not forget that the text of 3.2.30 is amended, not necessarily correctly; *Κυλλήνην* of the manuscripts could be the object of *ἀφείναι* and the clause about the destruction of *τὸ τεῖχος* refer to Elis itself.)

⁴⁹ 3.2.21 f., 30, Diod. 14.17.4 f., Thuc. 5.31 and 49, Hdt. 4.148.4, Str., p. 355.

⁵⁰ It is characteristic of Xenophon to leave us uninformed about the events alluded to in 5.2.2. Down to (and including) 392

been so openly out of sympathy with the Spartan cause that Agesilaus had felt it worth while not to expose to Mantinean ridicule the remnants of the division afflicted at the Pathos in Lechaëum (4.5.18). So much for the policies of the sort of men who were in the clientele of Pausanias. Clearly, if the Peloponnesian League was to continue, Sparta could not tolerate such independence, and the Eurypontids' opponents conceded the point. We are not informed about the attitude of Pausanias to the reduction of Elis, though there could hardly have been debate about whether to bring the city back into the League and the military action may not, as in Xenophon's account, have concerned only Agis.⁵¹ The case of Mantinea, however, is plain enough. Whatever Agesilaus' real motive for begging off the command (5.2.3), whether to put the odium on the other royal house or to make them play their part in what was generally agreed to be necessary, he certainly put the Agiad Agesipolis in the position of having to punish the very people who had been closely connected with his father, Pausanias. Agesipolis made no attempt to avoid the task, but carried it out thoroughly (*Hell.* 5.2.6 f.). He spared the lives of the trouble-makers, but made a repetition of the trouble impossible. Until the discrediting of Spartan military power at Leuctra, the Mantineans played their part readily (5.2.7), just as there was no more trouble with Elis, now unwallled. The repressive policy had worked. For Spartan power, a broad girdle across the Peloponnese of so-called autonomy, which was in fact imposed landed aristocracy, was best.

Phlius⁵² was different. She was sufficiently close to Argos to require walls and to maintain a sort of obedience to Sparta. In the Corinthian War, despite her democratic constitution and her suspicion of Sparta which led her to exile Spartan sympathizers (4.4.15, 5.3.13), she had not deserted the Spartan cause, even if she had been somewhat lukewarm in her support (4.4.15, 5.2.8), and it might be argued that she would have continued loyally enough if left to herself. This might have been the case, but it is undeniable that the severe policy of Agesilaus worked most effectively. Despite the great unrest in the Peloponnese after Leuctra in

Argos escaped ravaging (cf. 4.4.1, Andoc. 3.27). In 391 Agesilaus ravaged 'the whole of their land' (4.4.19). So perhaps the corn was sent then, as well as in 388 (4.7.5). The refusal to join in campaign on the excuse of truce (*ἐκεχειρία*) may relate to 388 when Agesipolis took the trouble to get divine approval for disregarding the proffered sacred truce, but Xenophon makes no mention of this in his fairly full account of that campaign (4.7.2–7) and the suspicion arises that when in 391 Agesilaus ravaged he too disregarded the proffered sacred truce but on his own initiative; hence the elaborate consultations of Agesipolis in 388, and the surprising brevity of Xenophon about the campaign of 391 (4.4.19)—a 'cover-up'. The reluctance to serve perhaps relates in part to the Nemea campaign of 394; it is curious that the Spartans are said to have taken the Tegeans and the Mantineans north with them but neither is listed in the order of battle (4.2.13 and 16).

⁵¹ The almost total discrepancy between Xenophon's account of the Elean War and the Ephoran version in Diodorus 14.17 can-

not be satisfactorily explained. E. Meyer, *Theopomps Hellenika*, 115 f., may have been right to suppose that both accounts are correct as far as they go, although his argument is unsound, viz. that they cannot be synchronized since a law forbade both kings to be on campaign at the same time (cf. Hdt. 5.75.2, and the Phliasiens' presumption that they were safe from Agesilaus when Agesipolis went north 5.3.10). Pausanias had gone to Haliartus when Agesilaus was in Asia (and cf. Thuc. 5.75.1), and the law was designed to prevent divided command of the same expedition. So Pausanias and Agis can well have attacked Elis from different directions, and Xenophon have concentrated on what he heard from Agesilaus and omitted the important part played by Pausanias. At any rate such scepticism about Xenophon can be at least entertained. His account of Agesilaus' campaign up the Hermus in 395 would be a parallel. However, there is much to be said for supposing that Diodorus has simply mixed up the names. Cf. the manuscripts at 14.17.4.

⁵² Cf. art. cit. above, note 46.

which Phliasian exiles expected to force their restoration,⁵³ Phlius stood firm until the end of the Peloponnesian League in 366. Others like Euphron of Sicyon (7.1.44) came to terms with the new order. Phlius endured attack by Argos and by Sicyon and earned the praises of Xenophon for her loyalty (7.2.1 ff.). There could be no better demonstration of the effectiveness of the repressive policy within the Peloponnese. As Agesilaus obliged his critics at the siege of Phlius to confess that the Spartans needed such men to fight beside them, so too by his support for his Phliasian friends, Podanemus and Procles, and their supporters he secured that the city continued to fight.

Corinth too remained loyal. The exiles restored through Agesilaus in 386 (*Ages.* 2.21) kept her firmly on Sparta's side after Leuctra,⁵⁴ thus providing Xenophon with a congenial home and Sparta with a strategically all-important headquarters for the war.⁵⁵ Pasimelus, the devoted supporter of Sparta in 392, was still in power in the 360s (4.4.7, 7.3.2). Agesilaus' policy of supporting friends (*φιλεταιρία*) worked where tolerance for democracies had proved disastrous.

But what of Sparta's relations with states outside the Peloponnese? Did Agesilaus aim to use with them the same formula, unmodified by considerations of their remoteness and magnitude? Was his policy towards the rising military power of Thebes ruinous for Sparta?

It is certainly right to speak of Agesilaus' policy, though it is only in the case of Thebes that differences clearly emerge. The case of Olynthus is unclear. Two views could be taken of the rise of Olynthian power. According to the one represented by Xenophon (5.2.11 ff.) Sparta acted in defence of the independence of Acanthus and Apollonia; Amyntas, king of Macedonia, is merely alluded to in the Acanthian envoy's speech. So the appeal was entirely within the framework of the King's Peace, in which Amyntas had not been included.⁵⁶ The other view is the Ephoran, represented in Diodorus (15.19.2 f.), viz. that the central element in the Spartan attack on Olynthus was the alliance with Amyntas, which is only to be presumed from Xenophon's account of the demands made on him by Teleutias (5.2.38), and there is some reason to take this view seriously. For both Thebes and Athens were said by the Acanthian envoy to be contemplating alliance with Olynthus (5.2.15), and this was only conceivable if the alliance was to be active against those not party to the King's Peace.⁵⁷ So Sparta chose to regard the Olynthian threat to other Greek cities in the area as more important than the defence of Greeks against outlandish Macedonians, and although we cannot be sure, it looks as if the moving spirit at Sparta was Agesilaus. The first three commanders,⁵⁸ Phoebidas, Eudamidas, and Teleutias, were all supporters

⁵³ Diod. 15.40, generally conceded to go with the preceding two chapters and to be wrongly inserted by Diodorus under 375/4.

⁵⁴ Cf. 7. 1.40 and 7.2.2.

⁵⁵ Xenophon is not explicit, but the words *περιέπλευσαν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα* at 7.1.28 shows that the allies were in council somewhere else, which presumably was Corinth.

⁵⁶ The 'outsiders' included in the King's Peace appear to be listed in Arist. *Panath.* 172 and Amyntas is not one. Cf. Cawkwell,

CQ, N.S. 23 (1973), 53, n.3.

⁵⁷ Cf. art. cit. in note 56.

⁵⁸ Diodorus' ordering of the commanders differs from that of Xenophon. Diodorus (15.20.3) has Eudamidas replace Phoebidas, who is made to command the force of over 10,000 sent in response to Amyntas' appeal (15.19.3); Xenophon has Eudamidas command the small force requested by the Acanthians (5.2.23) to be sent in advance of the large force (*τὸ εἰς τοὺς μυριάς σύνταγμα*) under the command of Teleutias (5.2.37), and he

of his, possibly all relatives.⁵⁹ So, clearly enough, Agesilaus did seek to exercise power in northern Greece and bring a city as remote as Olynthus into the Spartan system. It is no surprise to find 'the Olynthians and the Thraceward allies' forming one of the ten divisions in the Spartan military reorganization recorded by Diodorus (15.31.2) as part of the preparations for Agesilaus' campaign of 378, nor to find Olynthian cavalry in action against Thebes in 377 (5.4.54). But was all this disputed at Sparta? We simply do not know, though we may suspect. After the death of Teleutias, the Agiad king himself was sent out (5.3.9), perhaps merely to win his spurs as Agesilaus had done in Asia, also supervised by thirty Spartiates, but perhaps as part of a reaction against Agesilaus, his faction and his methods generally. On the death of Agesipolis, the harmost sent out to Thrace was Polybiades (5.3.20),⁶⁰ quite possibly son of the Naclidas who as ephor in 404/3 was won over by Pausanias to a policy opposed to the 'strong' policy of Lysander (2.4.29, 36).⁶¹ The settlement for Olynthus, which was lenient enough for Demosthenes (19.264) later to describe it as on the Olynthians' own terms, perhaps reflects Agiad ideas. Olynthus was starving and at the Spartans' mercy (5.3.26), and the Olynthian envoys to Sparta had nothing to bid with. If Agesilaus had been in full control at that moment, he might still have had to accept that a 'soft' commander would have to carry out the decision, and 'tough' settlements like that of Phlius needed a 'tough' executor. But perhaps the ephors of 380/79 were not whole-hearted supporters of Agesilaus, for the Phliasians had sought to have 'the authorities' (τὰ τέλη, a term which at the least involved the ephors—3.2.23) in Sparta rather than Agesilaus, dispose of their case (5.3.23). Agesilaus' friends had got him his way over Phlius. Perhaps Olynthus was too much. But this is largely conjecture. The case of Olynthus is no real help.

Over relations with Thebes the division at Sparta is plain. The Agiad Cleombrotus was suspected of Theban sympathies. He had certainly prosecuted the war in a very ambiguous manner. In the invasion of Boeotia in winter 379/8 he had done as little damage as possible and his army was led home uncertain whether Sparta and Thebes were at war or not (5.4.16). In 376 he was readily deterred from invasion by difficulties which Agesilaus had twice easily overcome (5.4.59). The supporter (Plut. *Ages.* 24.4), whom he installed as harmost in Thespieae, Sphodrias, was thought by some to have been inspired by him to raid the Piraeus (Diod. 15.29.5), but by the Thebans according to others including Xenophon (5.4.20; cf. Plut. *Ages.* 24.6), which argues suspicion of a coincidence of views between Cleom-

makes Phoebidas command, on the request of Eudamidas, a part of the advance force Eudamidas had had to leave behind (5.2.24). No doubt Diodorus epitomized carelessly in making Phoebidas take the 10,000; at 15.21.1 Teleutias is put in command of 'a considerable force' (the same phrase having been used at 15.19.3), and it is wholly unlikely that Ephorus had two large forces sent out against Olynthus in the space of a few months. But can Diodorus' ordering of the commanders be right? Possibly. Xenophon does not say what happened to Phoebidas or who replaced him, but it is surprising that the advance force of 2,000, which was entirely from within the borders of Sparta (5.2.24), is split in two parts. I at any rate incline to accepting the Ephoran order.

⁵⁹ Teleutias was a step-brother (4.4.19 with Plut. *Ages.* 21.1). Eudamidas, brother of Phoebidas (5.2.24), is the name of two later Eurypontid kings (cf. *PW* vi. 892). Of course the mother of Eudamidas I, the wife of Archidamos III, may have been the daughter of our Eudamidas, and imported the name to the Eurypontids.

⁶⁰ Agesipolis went out in time to damage the corn-crop and died in high summer (5.3.18 f.). So Polybiades was sent out under the same board of ephors, and his appointment perhaps reflects their influence even if they did not have the power to nominate.

⁶¹ Cf. Athen. 550 D (prosecution of Naclidas by Lysander for being overweight).

brotus and the Theban leaders. On the eve of Leuctra he was even suspected of wishing to avoid a battle which was expected to finish Theban independence; his opponents said 'Now certainly, the fellow will show whether he really cares for the Thebans as he is said to do' (6.4.5). Agesilaus was unremittingly hostile to Thebes. His 'enmity towards the Thebans' (5.1.33) led him to apply the King's Peace with special severity. The Theban envoys to Sparta in 387/6 had no expectation whatsoever that the Peace would be used to dissolve the Boeotian confederacy (5.1.32). Presumably in 392/1 there had been no suggestion of this (cf. Andoc. 3.19) and the embassy so contumaciously treated by Agesilaus in 390 was 'from the Boeotians' (4.5.6, 9). So the dissolution of 386 would appear to be the special twist of Agesilaus. Again in 382 not only was he thought by some to have prompted Phoebeidas to intervene in Thebes (cf. Diod. 15.20.2) but he actually persuaded the Spartans to retain the Cadmea (Plut. *Ages.* 23.11). Once war had broken out, despite earlier excuses of being too old for military service (5.4.16), he prosecuted it with vigour until his illness (5.4.58), and was accused of making the Boeotians good soldiers (Plut. *Ages.* 26.3, *Mor.* 190 F, etc.). In 371 he opposed the proposal of Prothous which would have forfeited the military advantage Sparta seemed to have (6.4.2, Plut. *Ages.* 28.6). He had isolated Boeotia from the Greeks in the Peace (6.3.19). Now the final solution was at hand.

What is behind this division of policy? It is to be noted that Agesilaus took a lenient attitude towards Athens. His military efforts were concentrated on Boeotia. He left Attica untouched. His reaction to the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy seems to have been to have a cautionary embassy sent to Athens (5.4.22, cf. Diod. 15.28.4), to judge by the name of one of the ambassadors, Etymocles (5.4.22), who was one of his supporters (Plut. *Ages.* 25.8), in contrast to the violent action of his opponent, Sphodrias. We are uninformed about his attitude to the restoration of the dual hegemony in the Peace of 375, but no anecdotes confront Agesilaus and Callistratus; Epaminondas is his special opponent. One might therefore suppose that Agesilaus was indifferent to the restoration of Athens as a naval power and as, potentially, an imperial power, and addressed himself solely to maintaining Spartan empire on land. But Sparta had been lenient to Athens. His hostility to Thebes seems to have derived from Theban policy in 395/4 which ruined his planned attack on Persia. When Ismenias was tried in 382, the charge against him was that 'he favoured the barbarian, had become guest-friend to the Persian for no purpose advantageous to Greece, had taken a share of the money sent from the Great King, and along with Androclidas was chiefly to blame for the whole disturbed state of affairs in Greece' (5.2.35). This was at a moment when Agesilaus seems to have been highly influential in Sparta, and perhaps reflects his attitude to Thebes and explains his bitter enmity. Cleombrotus on the other hand seemed to favour Thebes not because he approved of Theban illegality—after all, he did not hesitate to join battle in 371 (6.4.6) and in fact displayed skill and resolution in penetrating the Boeotian plain⁶²—but because he put his faith in diplomacy and alliances. This was why in 379/8 he did not create a state of war (5.4.16) as long as there was a chance of securing a diplomatic settlement. The liberation of Thebes was promptly followed by an appeal by the new government to Sparta, 'being ready to submit to Sparta and not to disturb any of the previous agreements with the Spartans' (Isoc. 14.29). Cleombrotus did not mind who was in power if formal treaties could be allowed to operate. Polybius, who was well read in the historical literature of the fourth

⁶² Cf. *CQ*, N.S. 22 (1972), 263.

century,⁶³ remarked (9.23.7) that 'whatever was done through King Cleombrotus, entirely adhered to the policy of alliance, but whatever through Agesilaus, the opposite', and this wholly accords with the general statement of Ephorus (in Diodorus 15.19.4) about the differing policies of Agesilaus and the Agiad Agesipolis. 'Agesipolis was peaceful and just and indeed of outstanding intelligence, and declared that it was necessary to abide by the sworn agreements and not to enslave the Hellenes in contravention of the Common Peace . . . but Agesilaus was by nature interventionist (*δραστικός*) and militaristic (*φιλοπόλεμος*) and clung to keeping power over the Greeks.' The Agiad line was consistent. Pausanias had come to terms with the Athenian democrats (2.4.38) and tolerated the popular leaders of Mantinea (5.2.3). Agesipolis was lauded by his father on the memorial at Delphi (Tod, *GHI* 120); 'Greece is united in sounding his virtue (*ἀρετή*)'. Hence the general wish to serve with him in the north (5.3.9 f.). Cleombrotus was in the same tradition of respecting formal agreements.

What Agesilaus would have wanted to do to Thebes had Sparta won the battle of Leuctra we can only guess. Certainly the Boeotian Confederacy would have been broken up and Plataea and Thespieae restored. Xenophon was at pains in the *Agesilaus* to deny that Agesilaus desired to destroy any Greek city and reduce its inhabitants to slavery (7.6). Perhaps he was fortunate that his hero did not get the chance with Thebes. But since he declared that Agesilaus' real reason for excusing himself from the command against Thebes in 379/8 was that Agesilaus did not want to be accused of helping 'the tyrants' (5.4.13), perhaps his method would have been what it had been at Phlius (5.3.25), viz. to purge the city of 'unsuitable' citizens and to establish a 'suitable' constitution with the initial aid of a garrison, the 'support of supporters' (*φιλευταιρία*) again. It cannot be proved, but perhaps his ideas on how to maintain domination were the same outside and inside the Peloponnese.

Was Agesilaus' policy outside the Peloponnese disastrous for Sparta? Certainly, if he did continue to desire a return to Asia, there was, as Isocrates remarked (5.87, *Letter* 9.12 f.), a fundamental inconsistency between that desire and the policy of establishing 'suitable' persons in the cities of Greece. But since after 394 a Hellenic crusade against Persia was merely a pipe-dream, this did not matter. The real question is whether his policy within Greece was not, despite Isocrates' approval, disastrous. Could the repression so effective within the Peloponnese have worked outside it, given the limitations of Spartan military resources?

It might be argued that repression had already failed in the case of Athens before Agesilaus became king, and attempts to repeat it elsewhere would inevitably fail. It would be comforting to think so, but it would be wrong. The system established by Lysander at Athens was essentially that later employed by Agesilaus, viz. to install in power a favoured party, supported by a garrison, and to be ready to sustain it with the full military might of Sparta. What ruined things at Athens was not the operation of this system but the failure to operate it. When Pausanias persuaded three of the ephors to his view (2.4.29 ff.) and took out an army, he subverted Lysander's plan (2.4.28) to bring the city to heel, and the accommodation with the leaders of the democratic insurgents left the party of Critias to their ruin. If Lysander had had his way, there would have been no independent Athens to answer the appeal of Thebes in 395. Precedent therefore

⁶³ Cf. F. W. Walbank, *Polybius* (1972), 79, n. 72.

strongly bade Agesilaus follow the course he took.

But perhaps his end was misconceived? He had resolved to do all that he could to prevent Boeotia being united under a powerful Thebes and this he had accomplished in the application of the King's Peace (see above, p. 79). Yet it might be argued that the limit of Theban ambition was the unification of Boeotia and, if Agesilaus had had the wisdom to permit as much, Thebes would never have conceived the aim of destroying Spartan power. Pagondas, the Theban Boeotarch, in his speech before the battle of Delium (Thuc. 4.92) had manifested no concern with anything more than the integrity of Boeotia. Surely Agesilaus was wrong to fear larger ambitions. But this case will not stand up to examination—on two counts. First, it was not clear that the opponents of the Laconophile Leontiades (*Hell. Oxy.* 17.1) were not bent on more than the unification of Boeotia. The Boeotians had come out of the Peloponnesian War very well. According to the Oxyrhynchus historian, the Thebans 'had progressed a great deal towards complete prosperity' (17.3 f.), and one has only to compare Sparta's expectations of Boeotia in 412 with those of her other allies (Thuc. 8.3.2) to see how much stronger economically she had become. Furthermore the Boeotian state was united (*Hell. Oxy.* 16.2 ff.) and apart from Oropus, which she snatched in 402/1 (Diod. 14.17), there was no more to desire. Yet the second part of the war onwards saw some manifestations of Boeotian independence and discontent with Spartan hegemony. In 419, called to help Heraclea in Trachis to defend itself, the Boeotians took over the defence of the city which was perhaps justifiable but dismissed the Spartan governor which was not (Thuc. 5.52). Alone of Sparta's allies, they demanded a tithe of the booty taken in the war (3.5.5, Plut. *Lys.* 27.4, Justin 5.10.12 f.). Perhaps fears of Spartan encirclement⁶⁴ prompted Ismenias to provide Thrasybulus with money for the return to Athens (Justin 5.9.8) and the city to abstain from helping to suppress Athens in 403 and Elis shortly afterwards (2.4.30, 3.2.25, 3.5.5). But the city had received the Athenian exiles in 404 (2.4.1, Diod. 14.6) before Lysander's activities in northern Greece could have begun to cause alarm, and the Boeotians secure in their united state must have seemed at Sparta unreasonably unco-operative. Above all, the events of 395 were a permanent warning. Sparta was engaged in Asia. There could be no question of immediate danger to Thebes. Yet Ismenias and Androclidas, if we may believe the version of the Oxyrhynchus historian (18.1) which is the same on this point as Xenophon's (3.5.3), worked to begin a war in central Greece which would embroil Sparta and in the course of it the Boeotians invaded Phocis and tried to take Hyampolis (*Hell. Oxy.* 18.5), an important site strategically⁶⁵ and close enough to the Boeotian border to raise doubts about whether had they taken it they would have been willing to let it go. What confidence could Sparta have that Boeotia had no ambitions to extend her power in central Greece? If Agesilaus judged in 386 that it would not be safe to leave Boeotia united for Ismenias, Androclidas and their large faction (5.2.31) to exploit, he was not clearly wrong. But, secondly, even if he was wrong, even if Boeotia had no ambitions outside herself, the military potential of the state was such that Sparta could not allow her the opportunity militarily to stand together. Eleven thousand hoplites and 1,100 cavalry (*Hell. Oxy.* 16.4) was a very large army,⁶⁶ probably the equal of either side in that 'greatest of Greek battles', First Mantinea (Thuc. 5.74). Great battles were rare in Greek warfare, but Boeotia had won two

⁶⁴ Cf. A. Andrewes, *Phoenix* 25 (1971), 217 ff. for such fears in the prelude to the Corinthian War.

⁶⁵ Cf. 6.4.27 and *PW* ix. 21.

⁶⁶ Cf. N.G.L. Hammond, *History of Greece*, Appendix 6.

since 450, Coronea and Delium, and military self-confidence was high (cf. *Mem.* 3.5.4), as the mood of 395 showed (*Andoc.* 3.25). Indeed Thebes had already begun to innovate in the art of war; the twenty-five-deep formation at Delium (*Thuc.* 4.93.4) and possibly an early version of the Sacred Band (*Diod.* 12.70.1) were shadows of things to come, as was the professionalism of Coeratadas (*Anab.* 7.1.33). Thebes was militarily aware as well as strong and confident. It would have been the height of folly for Agesilaus not to seek to restrict this power. For one thing, Boeotia was for Sparta, which lacked naval resources, on the only route to the north and so threatened the effective control of all the north of Greece, as the events of 382 must have suggested to Agesilaus. Boeotia was going on with alliance with Olynthus even after Sparta had decided to act against her (5.2.34), and, if Phoebidas had not acted, the army of Teleutias (5.2.20) could have been effectively denied passage. Again 395 was suggestive. Promises of Persian money had set the Corinthian War alight (*Hell. Oxy.* 18.1). Partnership between Persia and Boeotia was not inconceivable and prudence, if nothing else, must have bidden Agesilaus seek to keep Boeotia divided.

Nor was it safe to put trust in alliances. Alliance there had been in 395 and, for Sparta's interests, that was the blackest precedent. As long as the opponents of Leontiades were there, alliance or no alliance, Agesilaus could expect trouble. The Agiad principle would not work.

Xenophon naïvely saw Leuctra as the retribution of heaven against those who had occupied the Cadmea (5.4.1). Moderns in similar humour tend to see the battle as the inevitable consequence of Spartan policy. The truth is somewhat different. The battle was indeed the consequence of Agesilaus' policy and a glorious triumph it should have been. The situation on the eve of Leuctra, far from condemning Agesilaus, in a sense proved him right. Thebes stood unaided from outside. Jason was her ally (6.4.20 f.) but preoccupied, or lukewarm; when he arrived on the battlefield he had no mind to finish Sparta off. For the rest Thebes had to rely on a Boeotia in which Orchomenus, through long years nourished in dissidence by Sparta, had no part (*Diod.* 15.57.1) and in which Thespieae and others were hardly reliable (*Paus.* 9.13.8). The Boeotians in fact numbered 'not more than 6,000' according to Diodorus (15.52.2) and 'were appalled to see large numbers of the enemy forces' (15.53.2); according to Plutarch (*Pel.* 20.1), Cleombrotus had 10,000 hoplites and 1,000 cavalry. So Spartan policy had secured that Thebes, unaided, had to face a numerically much superior Peloponnesian army, her own forces at a lower figure than they had been or were to be for a generation. The military giant of Greece was ready to crush the upstart. Agesilaus was proved right.

Sparta should have won the battle of Leuctra. Why did she fail to do so? Certainly it was not a matter of over-all inferiority of numbers. After the reorganization of the alliance (*Diod.* 15.31.2) Sparta could put into the field large armies despite the decline in the number of Spartiates; in 378 and 377 Agesilaus' army in Boeotia numbered 18,000 (*Diod.* 15.32.1, 34.1), and the army of Cleombrotus outnumbered the Boeotians in 371 (see above). But, it might be asked, were there not too few Spartiates? Had not the real fighting strength of the Peloponnesian army dangerously diminished?

Certainly there were many fewer Spartiates on the battlefield of Leuctra than had fought at First Mantinea. Only four of the six divisions of the army were

with Cleombrotus and these included only those up to fifty-five years of age, a total of 700 Spartiates in all (6.4.15, 17),⁶⁷ whereas at Mantinea, if we trust, as we should, the figures of Thucydides, and if it is right to suppose that there was roughly the same proportion of Spartiates to non-Spartiates in the Spartan army as in the survivors of the force that crossed to Sphacteria in 425 (Thuc. 4.38.5), there must have been something like 1,750 engaged. Yet it is clear that Sparta did not hesitate to send Cleombrotus into Boeotia without the fullest number of Spartiates possible and no account of the battle suggests that this was a serious mistake. Although continual training made the Spartiates supremely formidable in combat, the supremacy of the army previously had been the supremacy of the whole. The Xenophonic *Constitution of the Spartans* of the 370s spoke with admiration of the army as a whole⁶⁸ (cf. chs. 11 and 12), and there is the same implication to be drawn from the celebrated anecdote concerning the distinction made by Agesilaus between 'the Lacedaemonians' and the allies when he sorted out the real soldiers from the amateurs (Plut. *Ages.* 26.7 ff.). The worth of the whole does not seem to have been estimated merely in terms of the number of Spartiates.

Of course, it may be argued that it was an error to confront the Thebans with only four divisions. Agesilaus in 378 had taken five divisions into Boeotia and the company of Sciritae (Diod. 15.32.1). Four divisions might have been just not enough. But there is nothing to this effect in the sources other than Xenophon. Diodorus (15.55 f.) and Plutarch (*Pel.* 23) ascribe the victory to the intervention of the Sacred Band, whose force was concentrated by Epaminondas on Cleombrotus and the bodyguard of the so-called *hippeis*.⁶⁹ Xenophon does suggest that the Spartans were overwhelmed by numbers: the Thebans were 'not less than fifty deep' and the royal bodyguard was 'pushed back' by 'the mass' (ὄχλος) of the Thebans (6.4.12, 14). But it is clear that he is talking merely of the battle around the king. The truth appears to be that it was the concentration of force, new in the experience of the Spartan army, which decided the battle, that it was not a matter of numbers but of the strategic genius of Epaminondas.

In so far as Agesilaus was responsible for the defeat, it was not in the decision to commit Cleombrotus' army unreinforced any more than in the policy of opposing Boeotian reunification. The real failure was the failure to adapt the Spartan army to the military needs of the age, which could only have been done by opening command of the army to the ablest soldiers. The kings of the age of Agesilaus did well enough in fifth-century terms but for the fourth century they were not minded to experiment and adapt. Various reforms of the consti-

⁶⁷ It is to be presumed that the force sent in 375 (6.1.1) had returned in that year after the Peace.

⁶⁸ According to W.G. Forrest, *A History of Sparta*, 134, 'there can be no doubt that Xenophon in the *Lak. Pol.* believes that he is writing about a purely Spartan army, not an army contaminated with perioikoi.' Ch.12.5 ἅπασιν Λακεδαιμονίοις argues otherwise: Λακεδαιμόνιοι only occurs in the chapters concerning the army apart from the official title of the Kings (15.9) and the reference to harmosts (14.2)—and it is well known that there were non-Spartiate harmosts; earlier, Σπαρτιάται is found. A

further argument derives from 11.6, where the distinction between those who lead and those who follow is readily discernible; presumably he is talking about Spartiates and non-Spartiates, not just fitter and less-fit Spartiates.

⁶⁹ In the army of the so-called *morai* (divisions) there were six of hoplites and six of cavalry (Xen. *Resp. Lac.* 11.4) and we meet a cavalry division at 3.3.10. There was also the so-called *hippeis* who formed the royal bodyguard in battle and fought on foot (Thuc. 5.72.4, Hdt. 8.124.3, Xen. *Resp. Lac.* 4.3).

tution seem to have been proposed,⁷⁰ and in particular Lysander may have had in mind the reform of election to the kingship of the ablest,⁷¹ which would have been a step in the right direction, if only a step since tenure would have continued to be for life. But Sparta could not make radical changes in its constitution even though Spartan society did change greatly; devotion to the laws of Lycurgus numbed the Spartan mind. Agesilaus was no exception. That was perhaps the king's real defect, but if he had been otherwise minded his reign would have been probably tempestuous, but certainly very short.

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⁷⁰ Cf. V. Ehrenberg, *PW* iii A. 1407 f. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1333^b11 ff. alludes to 'those who wrote' about the constitution. He may have had in mind partly such writers as Critias (see above, note 42) and Xenophon (Diog. Laert. 2.57), and such treatises as the *Resp. Lac.* preserved in the Xenophontic corpus, but there may have been a number of Spartans engaged in such theorizing when they were in exile. He mentions a Thibron who is probably (cf. *PW* vi A. 275) the man whom we meet in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, and who was exiled for most of the 390s (3.1.8 and 4.8.17). He does not say here anything, as one would dearly wish he had, of the treatise of King Pausanias (Ephorus F 118), composed in exile (1333^b34 seems to fit better Pausanias the regent—cf. 1307^a4). However, 1301^b20 speaks of him trying to destroy the ephorate, and since there is nothing we know of his reign which would justify such a remark, Aristotle may be allud-

ing to the argument of his treatise. Such speculation even by Spartiates would not be surprising, in an age when Spartan society was changing greatly with the new military role of the helotry and the institution of neodamodeis, the intrusion of coinage, albeit still denied to individuals, and the effect of experience outside Sparta in the service of empire.

⁷¹ The Ephoran version (Diod. 14.13, Plut. *Lys.* 30.4) envisaged the opening of the kingship to all Spartiates; another restricted it to certain families (Plut. *Lys.* 24–6). Xenophon kept a poker face (3.3.3). Nothing happened in Lysander's lifetime; the reform was known about only from reports of a speech, allegedly composed for him and found in his house. But, if Lysander had never in fact had such a proposal in mind, someone had conceived it, even if only to shock Sparta and discredit Lysander.